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From the myth of cyberspace 
to the political economy of computer communication
Vincent Mosco*
Abstract
The development of computer communication in the 1980s and 90s gave a new im-
petus to the set of myths connecting information technologies to the end of space, the 
end of time, the end of politcs and the end of history. Based on the Political Economy 
perspective, this article challenges the foundations of this symbolic construct and ex-
plains its unsustainability. Along these lines, it will be argued that cyberspace results 
from the mutual constitution of digitalization and commodification. Due to its poten-
tial to combine universial language with customized products, digitalization expands 
the commodification of content by expanding opportunities to measure and monitor, 
package and repackage entertainment and information. Mythic cyberspace might 
therefore might be little more than an highly commercialized space with scarce room 
for diversity and debate. 
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In the 1980s and 90s, with the arrival of global computer communication, the vision 
of a post-industrial society broadened into a set of myths connecting information 
technologies and the Internet to the end of history, the end of geography, and the end 
of politics. Myths can be understood for what they reveal, for example, the desire for 
identity and community, but also for what they conceal. In this case the myths of cy-
berspace are primary examples of what Roland Barthes (1972) meant when he defined 
myth as depoliticized speech. But they can also open the way to a renewed politics, 
particularly when the cultural analysis of myths is connected to political economy. 
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Myths conceal a great deal about the politics of cyberspace and in order to appreci-
ate the significance of this point, it is useful to turn to the political economic relation-
ship between digitization and commodification. They are central points on the bridge 
between the culture and the political economy of cyberspace. These two processes 
provided the foundation for the technological sublime that grew out of “magic places” 
like California’s Silicon Valley and New York City’s Silicon Alley and the grounding 
for the belief that we are entering the end of history, geography, and politics. 
Digitization refers to the transformation of communication, including words, im-
ages, motion pictures, and sounds into a common language. Providing the grist for 
cyberspace, it offers enormous gains in speed and flexibility over earlier forms of 
electronic communication which were largely based on analog techniques (Longstaff, 
2002). The latter physically mimicked communication by putting it into a form suit-
able for electronic processing and transmission. For example, on an analog system, 
the voice of a telephone caller creates a series of vibrations whose characteristics are 
sent over a wire and, provided they are amplified at regular intervals, transmitted to 
a receiver. A digital system literally translates that voice signal into the familiar code 
of ones and zero’s which have become the common language of electronic communi-
cation. Rather than the multiplicity of mechanical analogues that were employed to 
process oral, verbal and image signals, digitization enables one language to govern 
practically all electronic media. The fundamentals of translating, processing and dis-
tributing electronic communication no longer distinguish among a page of newspaper 
copy, a radio news broadcast, a CD recording, a telephone call, a television situation 
comedy, and an e-mail message. Each can be sent at high speed over various wired and 
wireless networks. 
Adopting a common, universal language for electronic media makes digitization 
enormously attractive. But another characteristic produces an additional significant 
leap in efficiency and flexibility. Digitization processes and distributes signals in 
packets that vary in size depending on the nature of the network. A digital telephone 
network does not send out an entire voice message, as did the old analog systems, but 
rather packages the message in groups for transmission. Each group or packet is pro-
vided with a discreet digital address which identifies it before transmission. Breaking 
up telephone calls, or television signals for that matter, into identifiable packets ena-
bles them to be shipped over different network routes on their way to reunification at 
the receiving end. In effect, one piece of a telephone signal may be followed by a piece 
of a television signal, with another piece of that same telephone call sent over another 
network. This provides significant gains in the efficiency of communication networks 
which used to become congested with traffic that could not be rerouted easily or bro-
ken up for efficient transmission. Communication is also made more effective because 
redundancy can be built into messages enabling multiple ways to correct for errors at 
the processing and distribution stages. Varieties of what is called “packet switching” 
thereby combine the universalizing tendencies of digitization with intelligent customi-
zation of communication packets to greatly expand the efficiency and effectiveness 
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of electronic communication. Viewed in this way, digitization combines elements of 
generalization, by applying one process or one language to electronic communication, 
with customization, by packaging its “inventory” of communication into micro units 
that produce the most efficient flow through networks. Myth-makers jump from here 
to the view that the world of atoms is morphing into a virtual utopia and it sometimes 
leads urban planners to confidently remake entire regions - with destruction and dislo-
cation considered a small price to pay for what amounts to an inevitable and necessary 
transformation in social life. 
Digitization takes place along with the process of commodification or the trans-
formation of use to exchange or market value. The expansion of the commodity form 
provides what amounts to the material embodiment for digitization. It is used first and 
foremost to expand the commodification of information and entertainment content, 
enlarge markets in the audiences that take in and make use of digitized communica-
tion, and deepen the commodification of labor involved in the production, distribu-
tion and exchange of communication. Digitization works in the context of powerful 
commercial forces and also serves to advance the overall process of commodification 
worldwide. In other words, commercial forces deepen and extend the process of digi-
tization because it enables them to expand the commodity form in communication. 
From a cultural or mythic perspective, cyberspace may be seen as the end of history, 
geography and politics. But from a political economy perspective, cyberspace results 
from the mutual constitution of digitization and commodification. 
Digitization expands the commodification of content by extending opportunities 
to measure and monitor, package and repackage entertainment and information. The 
packaging of material in the paper and ink form of a newspaper or book has provided 
a flexible, if limited, means to commodify communication by offering a useful form in 
which to measure the commodity and monitor purchases. Challenges arose when what 
Bernard Miège calls “flow” type communication systems arose, most significantly, 
television (Miège, 1989). It forced the question: how does one package a television 
program for sale to a viewer? Initially, commodification was based on a relatively 
inflexible system of delivering a batch of channels into the home and having viewers 
pay for the receiver and for a markup on products advertised over the air. This system 
did not account for different use of the medium; nor did it make any clear connection 
between viewing and purchasing. It amounted to a “fordist” system of delivering gen-
eral programming to a mass audience which was marketed to advertisers for a price 
per thousand viewers. Each step along the way to the digitization of television has re-
fined the commodification of content, allowing for the flow to be “captured” or, more 
precisely, for the commodity to be measured, monitored and packaged in increasingly 
more specific and customized ways. Early cable television improved on commodifica-
tion by charging per month for a set of channels. As this medium has become digitized, 
companies now offer many more channels and package them in multiply different 
ways, including selling content on a pay-per view basis. Material delivered over tel-
evision, the Internet or some combination of these and other new wired and wireless 
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systems can now be packaged and repackaged for sale in some related form with the 
transaction itself measured and monitored by the same digital system. There are cer-
tainly limitations on this process. People have been leaving newspapers in cafés, shar-
ing books, and otherwise confounding the precision of the commodification process 
for as long as the mass media have been around. So it comes as no surprise that music 
file sharing has become a way to avoid the high price of a music CD. But companies 
now have tools available to fight back with the support of governments more intent 
than ever to enforce media ownership rights and with technologies that increasingly 
provide what is being called the “digital armor” that significantly constrains the capac-
ity to copy and share digital media. The process of commodifying media, along with 
the back and forth which defines its extent and limitations, describes something far 
more banal than the end of history, but there is considerable power in this banality. 
Enhancing this power, the recursive nature of digital systems expands the com-
modification of the entire communication process. Digital systems which measure and 
monitor precisely each information transaction can be used to refine the process of 
delivering audiences of viewers, listeners, readers, movie fans, telephone and computer 
users, to advertisers. Companies can package and repackage customers in forms that 
specifically reflect both their actual purchases and their demographic characteristics. 
These packages, for example, of 18-25 year old women who order pop music con-
certs on pay-per view television, can be sold to companies, which spend more for this 
information because they want to market their products to this specific sector with 
as little advertising wasted on groups not interested or able to buy. This refines the 
commodification of viewers over the fordist system of delivering mass audiences to 
advertisers and it is being applied to almost every communication medium today. The 
applications are not always successful, as almost anyone trying to market the Internet 
version of early radio’s “University of the Air” will attest. Applications often meet 
with more than a little resistance because they are too demanding (program my VCR? 
interact with my TV set?) or too intrusive (why do you really need to know my age 
and income?) or simply don’t do what they are supposed to (you call that jumpy little 
picture on my desktop a video?) Nevertheless, there is also great power, even if not that 
of sublime mythology, in the commodification of audiences. 
The labor of communication is also being commodified as wage labor has grown 
in significance throughout the media workplace. In order to cut the labor bill and 
expand revenue, managers replaced mechanical with electronic systems to eliminate 
thousands of jobs in the printing industry as electronic typesetting did away with the 
jobs of linotype operators. Today’s digital systems allow companies to expand this 
process. Print reporters increasingly serve in the combined roles of editor and page 
producer. They not only report on a story, they also put it into a form for transmission 
to the printed, and increasingly, electronic page. Companies generally retain the rights 
to the multiplicity of repackaged forms and thereby profit from each use. Broadcast 
journalists carry cameras and edit tape for delivery over television or computer net-
works. The film industry is now starting to deliver digital copies of movies to theaters 
comunicação e sociedade 7.indd 02-08-2005, 17:3652
53Vincent Mosco l From the myth of cyberspace to the political economy of computer communication 
in multiple locations over communication satellite, thereby eliminating distribution of 
celluloid copies for exhibition by projectionists. Rather than break down Hollywood’s 
rigidly concentrated power structure, as some forecast,1 digitization and commodifica-
tion strengthen it. Companies sell software well before it has been debugged on the 
understanding that customers will report errors, download and install updates, and 
figure out how to work around problems. This ability to eliminate labor, combine it to 
perform multiple tasks, and shift labor to unpaid consumers further expands the rev-
enue potential (Hardt and Brennen 1995; McKercher, 2002; Sussman and Lent, 1998). 
Workers have responded to this with their own form of convergence, one that brings 
together people from different media, including journalists, broadcast professionals, 
technical specialists in the film, video, telecommunications and computer services 
sectors, into trade unions that represent large segments of the communications work-
force. The goal of one big union in cyberspace may be a mythical ideal but there is no 
doubting the trend toward labor and trade union convergence in the communication 
industries (McKercher, 2002; Mosco, 2002). 
Corporate integration and concentration
The mutual constitution of digitization and commodification contributes to the inte-
gration of the communication and information technology sector and the concentra-
tion of corporate power within it. The adoption of a common digital language across 
the industry is breaking down barriers that separated print, broadcasting, telecommu-
nications and the information technology or computer data sectors. These divisions 
have been historically important because they contained the legal and institutional 
marks of the particular period in which they rose to prominence. The print publishing 
industry is marked by a legal regime of free expression, limited government involve-
ment, and local ownership.    
Broadcasting and telecommunications rose to prominence alongside the rise of power-
ful nation-state authority and national production, distribution and exhibition sys-
tems. Western legal systems placed a greater regulatory burden on radio, television, 
and telephone systems, going as far as to create publicly controlled institutions in these 
sectors, in order to accomplish national objectives such as reflecting a national iden-
tity and building a national market. National firms were more likely than their more 
local print predecessors to control commercial broadcasting and telecommunications 
systems. The information technology or computer data industry took off in the post-
World War II era and embodies the trend away from nation-state regulation, except 
to advance the expansion of businesses, and toward control by multinational firms. 
There are numerous legal and institutional struggles within this sector, but it arguably 
1 As one analyst put it, “when digital filmmaking’s full potential is reached, a growing number of people in the industry 
believe, it might even threaten a studio power structure that has held firm since the advent of sound and has absorbed such 
technological challenges as television and VCRs.” (Lyman, 1999)
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began from the premise that, unlike the broadcasting and telecommunications sec-
tors, the computer industry would face little or no public interest or public service re-
sponsibilities, no subsidized pricing, no commitment to universality of access, and no 
expectation that national firms would be anything more than one step on the way to 
multinational control (Schiller, 1999; McChesney, 1999). This has become the model 
for the convergent communication industry. 
The growing integration of communication sectors into a consolidated electronic 
information and entertainment arena explains much of why there has been an un-
precedented acceleration in mergers and acquisitions. Communication systems in the 
U. S. are now largely shaped by a handful of companies including U. S. -based firms: 
Microsoft, AT&T, General Electric, Viacom, Inc., the Walt Disney Company, Time 
Warner, and the Liberty Media Corporation. There are others, including non-US-
based firms like News Corporation, Bertelsmann, Vivendi Universal, and Sony. Each 
of these firms also has a significant transnational presence through outright ownership, 
strategic partnerships, and investment. 
Concentration is far from just an American phenomenon. Consider Canada whose 
communication arena is arguably even more highly concentrated with four firms in 
the most dominant positions. These include BCE, Rogers Communication, CanWest, 
and Quebecor. (Some might add a fifth firm, Shaw Communication). BCE alone has 
spread over a wider terrain than even its admittedly larger American and European 
counterparts. The company’s former chair and CEO boasts about what would be the 
U. S. equivalent of BCE: “Start by combining the telephone businesses of Verizon 
Communications and SBC Communications. Then add Verizon’s wireless operations, 
and America Online’s Internet customers. Fold in ABC’s television network, the ESPN 
cable sports network and the Direct-TV satellite service. Finally, tack on The New York 
Times.” (Simon, 2001) Marveling at Bell’s ability to dominate the Canadian industry, 
a correspondent concludes that American antitrust officials and regulators would not 
permit such a conglomerate to be assembled in the U. S. (Ibid.). Whether this is true is 
debatable, but the combination of growing concentration and diminishing regulation 
certainly leads some, such as Cass Sunstein (2001), to fear that cyberspace will shrink 
from its mythic potential to advance democracy and become little more than a com-
mercial space with less than adequate room for diversity and the clash of ideas. 
The transformation, however, is far from complete. Canadian communication 
firms, like their counterparts in the United States, Europe and elsewhere face enormous 
pressures toward regional and global integration (Mosco and Schiller, 2001). In order 
to advance transnational corporate communications services in general, and commu-
nication services in particular, nationally controlled institutions would have to be elim-
inated or at least marginalized, and public service principles would have to be sharply 
reduced. U. S. corporate and political leaders lobbied intensively during the 1980s 
and 1990s to advance these changes within broader efforts to liberalize trade and 
investment rules. Playing important roles in this process were government initiatives, 
private economic diplomacy, bilateral negotiations between states, and multilateral 
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organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Trade Organization. The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) which brought together Canada 
and the United States and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which 
added Mexico, made up significant initiatives within this larger movement. Each was 
perceived as a prelude to a broader push for liberalization of global trade and invest-
ment within the organizational context of the frameworks established by the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Tensions and contradictions
Media concentration is a powerful force, but, as the dot-com and telecommunications 
debacles reveal, it often does not produce the synergies that companies anticipate and 
sometimes results in content that does not succeed in attracting audiences. Focusing as 
it typically does on the corrosive consequences of media integration, political economy 
tends to give inadequate attention to this point. At worst, the presumed power of me-
dia giants takes on its own mythic characteristics. Digitization is not a flawless process 
and technical problems have slowed its development. Furthermore, we can observe sig-
nificant political contradictions. Arguably the dominant political tendency today is neo-
liberalism which was founded on the retreat of the state from vital areas of social life, in-
cluding communication, where the state was once very significantly involved in building 
infrastructure, establishing technical standards, regulating market access, and providing 
services. According to neo-liberalism, such functions are best provided by the private 
sector with minimal state involvement. Specifically, neo-liberalism aims to customize 
state functions, tailor them to suit business needs, and thereby avoid what its supporters 
contend is the stalemate created by excessive public demands for state services. 
The communication arena demonstrates that it is not so easy to accomplish this 
feat. Consider first the development of technical standards. Digitization needs common 
technical standards to harmonize the processing, distribution, and reception of digital 
signals. It is one thing to turn audio, video, and data streams into digital packets; quite 
another to ensure their flawless flow through global grids. To accomplish this, it is es-
sential to set a wide range of standards for the equipment necessary to encode and de-
code signals and for managing data flows through networks. Achieving such agreement 
is normally quite difficult since competing firms are reluctant to cooperate because it 
requires sharing sensitive and economically valuable information. Societies have tradi-
tionally dealt with this problem by establishing government agencies or private-public 
partnerships to serve as independent standards arbiters. Almost a century and a half 
ago, competing telegraph interests established the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), a global body comprised of mainly government organizations and man-
aged on a one-nation, one-vote basis to set global standards for the new technology. 
Over the years, the ITU expanded its role as each new communication technology came 
along. Primarily, it set standards for the telephone, allocated broadcasting frequencies, 
and eventually the orbital locations of communication satellites. 
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However, as the number of nations grew, including former colonial societies eager 
to create standards that would help them to expand widespread access to commu-
nication technology (and not just the profits of communication companies), conflict 
grew at the ITU. As a result, core industrial powers, led by the United States, began 
to consider alternatives. These included, first, political bodies, like Intelsat, a global 
communication satellite organization whose rules permitted Western control and more 
recently, private corporations, such as ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers, which helps to establish technical standards for the Web. The 
goal of these organizations has generally been to set business-friendly standards, but 
to do so without sacrificing global credibility. 
The problem for defenders of this system is that it is increasingly difficult maintain 
both business support and global credibility. One reason is that digitization is now 
global and the competition to dominate markets for the short term by controlling 
one phase of a rapidly changing system or for the long term by setting an impor-
tant standard (such as for a computer operating system) is intensifying (Paré, 2003). 
Furthermore, the number of global interests is expanding so that even something as 
seemingly innocuous as setting a national suffix for a web address becomes a political 
question when, to cite one particularly fractious case, it is Palestine petitioning for . 
ps (Clausing, 1999). Should the common “.com” suffix expand to include “.union” 
as one public interest group proposed? Private businesses expect to depoliticize these 
issues by setting up Western controlled private or only quasi-public standards organi-
zations. But they are actually only displacing tensions and contradictions. 
In 2002 ICANN ultimately succeeded in eliminating democratically elected 
members of its board, but even this neo-liberal stroke does not guarantee smooth 
functioning (Jesdanum, 2002). The decision got rid of elected board members like 
Ken Auerbach who tried to democratize ICANN but consistently ran up again major 
bureaucratic and political problems. In frustration about trying to obtain ICANN 
financial records, he once complained that “We know more about how the College of 
Cardinals in Rome elects a pope than we do about how ICANN makes its decisions.” 
(Associated Press, 2001a) Auerbach met ICANN executives’ refusal to provide him 
with the organization’s records by turning to a judge who supported the dissident di-
rector’s request. ICANN responded by eliminating Auerbach and other elected board 
members (Geist, 2002a). One telecommunications analyst now calls for the elimina-
tion of ICANN, charging that the agency sunk to a new low by meeting in locations 
distant from most of the activists who have been pressing for change in order to keep 
them from showing up at meetings. The decision to eliminate elected board members 
was made at an ICANN meeting in Shanghai, China, hardly a bastion of democratic 
communication. Critics contended that it was also a site that would press the budgets 
of ICANN’s dissidents (Weinstein, 2002). They wonder about the irony of an inter-
national organization set up to address the needs of the new online global commu-
nity, appearing to do what it can to keep its representatives as far away as possible. 
Returning to the world of myth, one is tempted to wonder, perhaps with tongue in 
cheek, if this is what the “end of geography” really means. 
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In light of the numerous disputes, often very acrimonious, one should therefore not 
be surprised that ICANN’s legitimacy has suffered. Moreover, it should come as no 
surprise to learn that savvy computer users are, to use geek lingo, developing “work 
arounds” for the ICANN problem. A 2001 report found more than 500 top-level do-
mains operated around the world by some 200 administrators, all outside the official 
domain name system (Weiss, 2001). How many more rogue networks will be added to 
that total as ICANN loses more of its legitimacy? One seemingly ironic consequence 
has been a stepped-up effort to shift international decision making power over domain 
names to the grand old regulatory body, the ITU, which in October 2002 approved a 
resolution on managing multilingual domain names and one analyst has gone as far as 
to suggest that the ITU will likely emerge “as the governance leader.” (Geist, 2002b) 
Many participants at the 2003 World Summit on the Information Society pushed hard 
for transferring power from ICANN to the ITU. Nevertheless, this alternative, setting 
up genuinely public, national or international regulatory authorities, a central feature 
in the expansion of communication before post-industrialism became the reigning 
myth, risks turning this arena into a highly contested terrain. 
The contradiction between the desire to free business to act in its own interest and 
the need for government regulation has also marked debates about how to expand ac-
cess to technology in order to build markets and about how to ensure some measure 
of privacy to create consumer confidence in the technology. For example, in the early 
days of radio, business felt that it did not need government to regulate frequencies 
(after all, this was the end of history). But the result was near chaos, as broadcasters 
poached each other’s frequencies and the airwaves were filled with worthless static. 
Businesses responded by supporting government regulation which succeeded in bring-
ing some order to the chaos. However, this private arena was now opened to the wider 
public which used the opportunity to fight for public broadcasting and the regulation 
of private station content. The technology has indeed changed, leading some to reim-
agine revolutionary transformations, but the political economic dynamic has not and 
so the same tensions and contradictions mark the world of digitization. 
Consider the shocking burst of the telecommunications bubble. Once industry gi-
ants like Nortel, Cisco, Lucent, and now WorldCom (this icon of the telecom boom 
was bounced from the Nasdaq and S&P 500 in 2002 and had its credit rating reduced 
to junk status), shrink into economic obscurity. Between 2000 and 2002, Nortel and 
Lucent lost 98 percent of their stock value and, between the two alone, shed 148,000 
jobs out of a total of more than 500,000 lost in the U. S. telecommunications industry. 
WorldCom’s demise is extraordinary even in the context of the most substantial crash 
in the history of the telecommunications industry. Once America’s second largest tel-
ecommunications carrier, the company filed for bankruptcy in July 2002. With $107 
billion in assets, it was the largest such action in United States history. By October 2002 
the company had been charged with $7. 4 billion worth of accounting irregularities. 
Building its capitalization on a variety of shady practices, including its proclamation 
that Internet traffic was doubling every 100 days, a claim dignified in government re-
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ports that repeated it, WorldCom appeared to be the new model for the Internet-savvy 
telecommunications industry. Aided by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which 
diminished scrutiny over the company, WorldCom enjoyed what amounted to a blank 
check from regulatory authorities. By March 2003 the company had to write down 
its assets by $80 billion, including lowering the value of its tangible assets from the 
$44.8 billion paid down to $10 billion. This led one industry analysis to conclude “So 
Worldcom paid $1 for assets that are now worth 2 cents. At last we know how gross 
was the misallocation of capital in the telecommunication industry in the late 90’s. And 
how deep is the telechasm.” (Morgenson, 2003) Or as a former deputy general coun-
sel at the FCC put it, “the agency was oblivious to the enormous accounting fraud at 
WorldCom.” He called for stripping the company of the licenses and certifications it 
needs to do business (Sidak, 2002: A31). But WorldCom, though arguably the worst 
case, was hardly alone. At the end of 2001, the eight largest telecommunications com-
panies collectively owed $191 billion and, with demand flat, there was little prospect of 
debt repayment (Goodman, 2002). This was partly because even companies like AT&T 
and Sprint, which have not been accused of WorldCom’s offenses, faced enormous pres-
sure to meet the quarterly results that WorldCom appeared to be generating. Unable 
to do so legitimately, they saw their stock value pummeled, and even these companies 
were forced to restructure operations and replace senior management (Schiesel, 2002). 
Beneath these sobering facts lie what some fear is a fundamental change in the 
nature of research in these vital industries. The most telling example is the case of J. 
Hendrik Schon who worked for Lucent Technologies’ Bell Labs. The microelectronics 
community was rocked in 2002 when an expert panel determined that Schon, who 
had risen to the mythic status of science superstar for his work on molecular-level 
transistors, determined that he fabricated data and altered experimental results for 
work published in the field’s most prestigious journals including eight in the journal 
Science. Under intense corporate pressure to produce breakthroughs in nanotechnol-
ogy, Schon and some of his colleagues cheated. The views of theoretical physicist and 
MacArthur “genius” grant winner Paul Ginsparg are telling. In response to a question 
about what the Schon case means, he did not hesitate: “The demise of Bell Labs by 
becoming corporate. People just assumed that there’s no way that institution would 
allow this to happen. And let me tell you, years ago this never would have happened 
at Bell Labs. The heads of departments would have kept tables. The investigating 
committee asked Schon, Where are your lab notebooks, and he didn’t systematically 
keep them. Raw data? Didn’t keep them.” (Weed, 2002: 27) Fearing the loss of some 
of America’s fundamental communication equipment providers, the chairman of the 
Federal Communications Communication actually resorted to a speech pleading with 
the telephone companies and other telecommunications operators to buy more equip-
ment. To which the chief procurement executive for Verizon, a major telecommunica-
tion operator in the United States which continues to cut back on its own workforce 
responded, “we’re not to the point where we are going to reach in and send a check to 
support them. That’s not going to happen.” (Feder, 2002)
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The overall decline in the dot-com and telecommunications industries, and, most 
importantly, the chasm between the massive glut of high-speed, long haul informa-
tion lines and the shortage of high-speed, local access connections, can be directly 
traced to the almost religiously driven neo-liberal strategy that the market would 
do a better job of regulation than traditional forms of state intervention. Indeed, 
cyberspace fed a powerfully compelling myth of the market that insisted we have 
reached a point where policy can do away with government regulation. Friction-free 
capitalism, as Bill Gates called it, was at hand and Washington would take the lead 
by eliminating many of its own responsibilities. So with few regulatory, political or 
social policy checks on investment decisions, cemented into law in various forms, in 
the U. S. it was the 1996 Telecommunications Act, firms went on a long haul building 
binge. Once the Bush Administration came to power in 2001, key regulatory agen-
cies like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Communications 
Commission weakened regulatory oversight and enforcement even more. The build-
ing binge was carried out by large as well as small firms. Assets mattered little because 
Wall Street was flush with “new economy fever” (after all this was the end of history) 
and capital was easy to raise. 
Even liberals bought into this view with their own mythology: If you build it, they 
will come. Well, as it turns out, to summarize a government report of September 2002, 
despite the fact that almost all U. S. families live in areas where a high-speed Internet 
connection is available, many see no compelling reason to pay extra for it (U. S. govern-
ment, Department of Commerce, 2002). People who once envisioned the “broadband 
revolution” now predict a slow evolution with declining annual growth rates resulting 
in, at best, one-third of U. S. households with broadband by 2006 (Romero, 2002b). 
Similar results documenting the persistence of cyberspace “choose-nots” have been 
found in Canada (Reddick, 2002). Some have even come to doubt the economic value 
of combatting the “digital divide” between rich and poor nations (Kenny, 2003). This 
has not stopped people from trotting out version after version of the myth. According 
to one technology reporter, “Perhaps it is time to update the old adage: ‘If you give me 
a fish, you feed me for a day. If you teach me to fish you feed me for life. ’ Maybe it 
should now say: ‘If you give me information, you answer one of my questions. If you 
get me online, you let me answer my questions for myself’.” (Thompson, 2002) Even 
a report from a left-wing think tank, published in the midst of the most substantial de-
cline ever experienced by the telecommunications industry, calls for diminishing regula-
tion of telephone companies (referred to as “regulatory symmetry”) to enable them to 
speed up the production of broadband networks (Pociask, 2002). Nevertheless, by the 
end of 2002 it remained the case that, aside from eBay, which also has it doubters on 
Wall Street, and, to an even lesser degree, Amazon, the only businesses actually making 
money from the Web were, as one article gingerly put it, those “appealing to baser in-
terests or making use of questionable business practices.” Among these were sex-related 
businesses including subscriptions to image and video sites and businesses promising 
enhanced sexual prowess (Schwartz, 2002a; Tedeschi, 2002). 
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Caught in the crunch, industry leaders are not particularly optimistic. As one from 
AT&T put it, “I think that approach of ‘build it and they will come’ has been a dis-
aster for the industry. I don’t think we’re ever going to see it again.” (Howe, 2002) 
Not everyone agrees with this point of view. Michael Lewis, author of The New New 
Thing, a best-seller praising the Internet, writes “In Defense of the Boom,” that it 
was far better than the current wave of “retribution” would admit. Sure, companies 
overbuilt the telecommunication system adding unnecessary capacity, “which is a bit 
wasteful - we don’t need it yet - but not a total waste: we will need it one day soon.” 
(Lewis, 2002: 49) 
One company that persists in this view is Global Crossing which was once touted 
by Internet myth-maker George Gilder to be a solid contender to dominate the tel-
ecommunications industry in the new century. This firm, led by a protégé of junk 
bond felon Michael Milken, managed to raise $750 million almost overnight, went 
public, reached a value of $30 billion, built a transatlantic fiber network valued at 
much less and with a glut in capacity (actually 95 per cent of fiber network capacity 
goes unused) collapsed in January 2002. The company’s share value declined by 99 
percent to 13. 5 cents a share and it filed for bankruptcy in January 2001, the largest 
one by a telecommunications company, joining other high fliers like 360 networks, 
which Gilder, in another one of his influential prognostications, claimed would bat-
tle Global Crossing for telecommunications supremacy in the twenty-first century 
(Romero, 2002a; “The Great Telecoms Crash,” 2002). Fearing a case of “Enronitis,” 
the F. B. I and the Securities and Exchange Commission launched investigations of the 
company in February 2002. As it turns out, Global Crossing was literally connected 
to the icon of corporate malfeasance Enron in a complex deal brokered by a third 
party which enabled both Enron and Global Crossing to circumvent accounting rules, 
allow both firms to book revenue, and Global Crossing to hide a loan (Barboza and 
Romero, 2002: C5). 2  This appears to be part of a wider practice whereby Enron and 
other energy companies sought to demonstrate that they were comers in the broad-
band communication business by trading broadband capacity back and forth with 
one another, thereby pumping up the appearance of major activity in the broadband 
market (Barboza, 2002: C1). These firms were the real magicians of the marketplace, 
confounding the known laws of economics and physics by making something appear 
from nothing and making their top executives very wealthy in the process. 
Comparing the telecom situation to Enron, one business correspondent concluded 
in March 2002 that “a tragedy of identical plot, but with far more damaging impli-
cations,” is playing out in telecommunications. However, unlike the saga of Enron, 
this is not about a single company with mischievous executives, “this tale is about 
2 Enron was not the only friend of the Bush Administration with ties to Global Crossing. In 2003 the company agreed to pay 
Richard N. Perle, a close Bush adviser and chairman of the influential Defense Policy Board, $725,000 to help the company 
win government approval to sell the company to a joint venture based on Hong Kong and Singapore. His support was 
considered particularly important since both the Pentagon and the FBI opposed the sale (Labaton, 2003). 
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an entire industry that rose to a value of $2 trillion based on dubious promises by 
Wall Street and company executives for an explosive growth in demand.” Cozy rela-
tions among formally competing firms led to what seems to be agreements to pad 
demand forecasts, overvalue assets and otherwise cook the books (Morgenson, 2002: 
1). Insiders were able to dump their stock at inflated prices before the collapse set 
in (Berman, 2002). As, according one article, “the fiber optic fantasy slips away,” 
the promise of universal access to broadband communication remains just a promise 
(Romero and Schiesel, 2002).  
Meanwhile, in another spin of the wheel, even well known bankers like Felix 
Rohatyn, who once engineered a bailout when New York City declared bankruptcy, 
calls for a return to rigorous regulation to combat what he has called “the betrayal 
of capitalism.” (Rohatyn, 2002a: 6) According to this pillar of the Establishment, 
“I believe that market capitalism is the best economic system ever invented for the 
creation of wealth; but it must be fair, it must be regulated, and it must be ethical. The 
excesses of the last few years show how the system has failed in all three respects... . 
the system cannot stand much more abuse of the type we have witnessed.” (Rohatyn, 
2002b: 6) The telecommunications industry has arguably suffered more than the 
computer industry from mismanagement and corporate crime. But Silicon Valley 
shows little evidence of learning from the sorry example of telecommunications. The 
General Counsel for a large California investment company concludes that “Silicon 
Valley ‘corporate governance’ is an oxymoron.” Success is measured by money raised, 
newspaper mentions, and general visibility, not by revenue. According to its critics, the 
Valley’s swashbuckling approach to management “means more shareholder disasters 
waiting to happen.” (Richtel, 2002)3 Nor does Washington hold out much hope for 
Rohatyn. In August 2002 President Bush reaffirmed his longstanding view that more 
deregulation is needed to expand access to broadband and other high-speed Internet 
services (Krebs, 2002). The man he appointed to head the Federal Communications 
Commission agreed and proceeded to launch a series of steps to further reduce restric-
tions on corporate activity in the mass media and telecommunications. But there are 
some within the industry who worry about this strategy. According to the general 
counsel for AT&T, the industry’s problems can be directly traced to the fact that 
“enforcement has not been vigorous enough. When so many problems have been a 
result of a lack of oversight, it’s not generally wise to say let’s deregulate further.” 
(Labaton, 2002: C8) But with the Republicans winning control of the U. S. Senate in 
November 2002 and the Federal Communications Commission insisting that its poli-
cies are sound, deregulation, and the problems that Rohatyn has so clearly identified, 
continued. 
3 Here is how one long-time technology executive described her experience with the boards of dot-com firms: “I got off a 
couple of boards where I couldn’t stomach what was going on. The capacity for illusion was limitless. You’d have a board 
meeting, and you’d say ‘Where’s the revenue page?’ And the C. F. O. would say: ‘Oh, don’t worry about revenues. We’re 
just looking at expenses, so we know when we need to raise more money.” (Race, 2002: C3)
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Finally, a similar conundrum shapes the issue of privacy. The drive to use com-
munication and especially the new media of cyberspace to expand the commodifica-
tion process now includes personal identity (Lyon, 2001). From a political economy 
perspective the threat to privacy is not just an offshoot of technology or a correctable 
oversight but is arguably intrinsic to the commodification process. From this point of 
view, the struggle for personal privacy is part of a wider one against the expanding com-
modity. The terrain for the struggle extends widely but “personal content” software 
provides one of the better examples. In January 2001 Nortel Networks announced a 
new line of this software that the company proposed to sell to Internet service provid-
ers. It would package online services to suit individual preferences by tracking every 
choice a user makes on the Internet and configure the network to deliver efficiently the 
kinds of material typically selected. In effect, Nortel’s strategy, like that of numerous 
other firms, is to add value to the Internet by making it more responsive to customer 
profiles. But in doing so, the company makes it possible to gather, package, and share 
information on customer choices, thereby expanding the commodification of content 
and audiences. The response of one privacy activist focuses on the company’s respon-
sibility charging that it is “unacceptable” to enable Internet service providers to watch 
where customers are going. However, Nortel’s behavior is less a matter of corporate 
irresponsibility and more that of a firm which needs to expand the commodification of 
its major resource, the Internet. Given the company’s precarious financial position, it is 
certainly understandable that Nortel would try to build a market in expanded Internet 
content and in the audiences that use it. But Nortel’s product also reflects a fundamen-
tal contradiction besetting the business of cyberspace, i. e., the conflict between the 
goals of building consumer confidence to turn the Internet and its users into a universal 
market and commodifying without government intervention whatever moves over the 
Internet, including personal identity (Associated Press, 2001b). 
The end of the end of history?
In her award winning book No Logo, Naomi Klein (2000) maintains that the culture 
of globalization is built on the creation of a branded world. Starting from the view 
that the brand is “the core meaning of the modern corporation,” she documents the 
global spread of brand identities made most successful in such visual brand icons as 
the Golden Arches of McDonalds and the Nike Swoosh. Brands have spread beyond 
the specific commercial product, like the hamburger or the running shoe, to encompass 
places, events, people, activities, and now governments. As Peter van Ham reminds us 
in a provocative piece on the postmodern or branded state, England has become Cool 
Britannia, tiny Belgium, reeling from scandals ranging from child pornography rings 
and dioxin-polluted chicken, hired a branding team that recommends the country use 
“. be” as its logo and follow the lead of the Virgin corporation, which isn’t big but you 
see it wherever you look. Similarly, Estonia is no longer a post-Soviet or even a Baltic 
state; it is pre-EU or downright Scandinavian. Unable to boast Finland’s cell phone gi-
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ant which leads some to call that country Nokialand, Estonia markets itself as a tiny 
green jewel, the un-Cola of industrial states and as E-Stonia, for its use of the Internet 
and strong presence in cyberspace (van Ham, 2001). 
If we can brand countries, why not the world? Indeed, from a cultural perspective, 
globalization might be better viewed as a brand for the world. It exists sui generis as 
the word for what is happening today, not unlike the mantra whose utterance places 
the chanter among a group of believers who need say no more. Concepts lead to ques-
tions. As a mythic brand, globalization leads only to one response: Amen. In essence, 
brands are the depoliticized speech, the period, exclamation point, and cultural or 
rhetorical stop sign of globalization.4
But proponents of a branded world are facing global social movements that in 
many old and new ways resist the power of the corporate and government brand. This 
demonstrates that mythic brands are more than depoliticized speech. Yes, for some, 
the Golden Arches and the Swoosh serve as powerful stop signs to political conversa-
tion and action. But, following Doniger’s position, they can also be prepolitical, the 
first step in a process that can restore, rather than deny, with every critical retelling, a 
political grounding that myths appear to leave out (Doniger, 1998). In essence, myths 
can end politics, can serve to depoliticize speech, but they can also restore it by provid-
ing a rich cultural dimension that deepens political understanding. Indeed, cyberspace 
advances a form of political convergence that makes increasingly transparent the di-
visions between culture and political economy as well as between consumption and 
labor. In doing so, cyberspace fosters an anti-globalization movement that merges the 
politics of labor from an earlier era (Denning, 1996) with the politics of representa-
tion that marked a more recent time (Klein, 2000). Mass demonstrations in Seattle, 
Prague, Quebec, Genoa, Washington, D. C., and Miami, as well as the global move-
ments organized around culture jamming are grounded in a powerful and broad-based 
understanding of the convergence of labor and consumption in the world today. These 
movements understand the links between Nike ads and sweatshops making running 
shoes, as well as between familiar brands like Wall-Mart, Esprit, Kmart, J. C. Penney, 
etc. and what can only be described as new forms of slave labor. The links between 
business and slave labor today are increasingly filling press accounts. In 2002, this 
was documented in a chilling account of slavery in the mahogany-rich forests and fast 
food producing cattle ranches of Brazil (Rohter, 2002).5 Global social movements are 
today based on the ability to strip the cover from the gloss of a brand to reveal not 
only the exploitation of labor, but also the commercialization of life and threats to the 
earth’s environment. Today’s movements range widely and include some whose work 
is primarily in cyberspace, such as the open source movement, what one analyst calls 
4 Coca Cola has actually branded highway signs across Tanzania so that its brand is literally that nation’s stop sign. 
5 But there is nothing very new in this account. Back in 1995, the front page of The New York Times featured a report 
on what amounted to slave labor in the Brazilian rain forest. The twin forces of debt and intimidation fill both articles 
(Schemo, 1995). 
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a loose network army of 750,000 software programmers worldwide made up of hack-
ers, crackers, and people running file sharing heirs to Napster like KaZaA. The force 
is typically far looser than most armies, but it tends to unite against commercialism 
and the concentration of corporate control over cyberspace (Hunter, 2002). It is also 
made up of the Centri Sociali movement in Italy that fights to reclaim public space. 
Their strategies and tactics are not always in line and there is always the threat of 
co-optation (Himanen, 2001; Wright, 2000; Harmon, 2002). But they are united in 
providing a genuine alternative to the world that Fukuyama describes as inevitable. In 
Naomi Klein’s blunt words, combining a cultural and political economic understand-
ing, they aim to bring about “the end of The End of History.” (Klein, 2001) 
As Klein and Dyer-Witheford (1999) describe, many of the major opposition 
movements have been based on building global political networks through the use 
of communication systems. This strategy takes many forms including attacks on the 
communication systems of transnational companies and their political organizations, 
such as occurred in January 2001 when Microsoft’s computer networks and the serv-
ers containing private data, such as credit card information, on the elite participants at 
the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland were hacked and opened 
(Weisman 2001; Reuters 2001b). It also includes the use of computer communications 
to organize an alternative to the annual Davos meeting that brought together some 
20,000 people in Porto Allegre, Brazil for the World Social Forum, a six day meeting 
whose theme “Another World is Possible” featured social movement groups represent-
ing labor, women, the environment, minorities and numerous other communities. 
This potential for a political convergence between labor and consumption dem-
onstrates that convergence does not just mean plugging a cable modem into a PC, 
or AOL into Time Warner. For some, these global social movements hold out hope 
for a renewed public sphere, cosmopolitan citizenship and a genuinely democratic 
cyberspace. The convergence of labor and consumption and the politics of citizenship, 
which seem to mark so much of what gets all too glibly called the anti-globalization 
movement, may be the most significant form of convergence to understand today. But 
there was more such hope before the events of September 11. 
The end of history, geography and politics are compelling myths and they are made 
all the more powerful with the expansion of cyberspace. However, with the spread of 
anti-globalization movements, and the substantial boost that cyberspace has provided 
them, even more so with the events of 9/11 and subsequent wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, it appears that time, space and power have returned with a vengeance Indeed, we 
may be seeing the emergence of a new mythology, or the return of an old one. As John 
Cassidy put it, “After September 11, it seems ludicrous to speculate about an escape 
from history or geography.” (Cassidy, 2002: 313) Putting it more powerfully, Robert 
Kaplan envisions a world ravaged by war, disease and environmental havoc, all of 
which lay the groundwork for what he calls The Coming Anarchy (1997). 
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